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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIECE MIKKELSEN, : Brief of Appellant 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Supreme Court No. 860629 
• 
vs. District Court No. 77934 
: Judge Ronald 0. Hyde 
MARLAN J. HASLAM, M.D., 
: Priority No. 14(b) 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. In view of the fact that the jury found that defendant 
negligently gave plaintiff advice that she could ski and the 
further fact that the giving of said advice caused plaintiff's 
injuries, were contributory negligence and/or assumption of risk 
still viable or possible defenses? 
2. Was it proper for the trial court to refuse to give 
plaintiff's requested instructions on the issues of proximate 
cause, assumption of risk and contributory negligence? 
3. Is plaintiff entitled to judgment in her favor on the 
issue of liability? 
4. Was it proper for the trial court to leave to the jury 
the questions of whether plaintiff was negligent and/or had 
assumed the risk simply "by skiing" when there was no evidence to 
indicate that her injuries were caused by the "manner" in which 
she skied. 
5. Should this case be referred back to the trial court 
for a new trail on the issue of damages only* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought the above entitled medical malpractice 
case against defendant alleging that defendant failed to properly 
advise plaintiff with regard to her limitations, and failed to 
give her follow-up examinations, following a total hip replacement 
surgery. In addition, plaintiff alleged that approximately five 
years after her operation, she telephoned defendant and asked him 
if she could take up skiing. Plaintiff testified that 
Dr. Haslam's response was that plaintiff could ski and that she 
should " go and have a good time." Plaintiff further testified 
that Dr. Haslam failed to monitor her condition on a regular, 
periodic basis post operatively. Plaintiff's expert medical 
witnesses testified, without dispute, that in the years that 
followed plaintiff's last operation, medical knowledge became 
overwhelming that, over a period of time, loosening of the 
artificial hip components and bone resorption in and about the 
components were becoming major problems. 
After receiving defendant's approval, plaintiff took up 
skiing. On March 2, 1980, while skiing carefully under the 
supervision of a professional skiing instructor, plaintiff 
felt a pop in her right hip, after which she fell. 
This case was tried before the court and jury, commencing on 
June 23, 1986, and concluding on July 1, 1986. The jury returnedO 
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a verdict finding that defendant was negligent and that said 
negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injury. The jury also 
found that plaintiff was negligent "by skiing", and that said 
negligence caused her injuries. The jury assessed the negligence 
as 50% on the part of defendant and 50% on the part of plaintiff. 
The trial court concluded the case by finding that plaintiff was 
not entitled to damages. 
Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the entry of judgment in 
her favor on the issue of liability and requesting that a new 
trial be granted on the issue of damages only. The trial court 
denied plaintiff's motionf and entered judgment in favor of 
defendant. Plaintiff thereafter perfected this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. DaNiece Mikkelsen, plaintiff, was born in Ogden, Utah on 
June 14, 1934. She has spent virtually her entire life in Ogden. 
(R. 509.) She married Gary Mikkelsen in 1955. She has one 
child, Kathy Mikkelsen Meeker. (R. 514.) 
2. DaNiece was born with a congenital dislocated right hip 
that, in her youth, caused her to walk with a limp and became 
painful at times. She was limited in sporting activities but 
could ride a horse, ride a bicycle and could attend school 
dances. (R. 510.) 
3. From the ages of two to four years, DaNiece was placed 
in a series of casts to try to correct the position of her 
right leg and hip, by Dr. Dumke of Ogden. (R. 510-511.) 
4. At about the age of 14 years, DaNiece underwent surgery 
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by Dr. Lewis Perryf an orthopedic surgeon of Ogden, Utah. 
Dr. Perry placed a plate and screws in her right upper femur to 
stabilize her condition and prevent further slippage of her femur 
up over her hip socket. (R. 511.) 
5. Following Dr. Perry's surgery, DaNiece was able to 
resume her previous activity level until the 11th grade when her 
hip became painful from climbing stairs at Ogden High School. 
Because of this situation. Dr. Perry suggested she drop out of 
school, which she did. (R. 513.) 
6. On November 15, 1957, Gary Mikkelsen suffered an 
accident at his job with the railroad which resulted in the 
amputation of both his legs. (R. 515.) Because of her husbandfs 
accident, DaNiece had to assume the responsibility of maintaining 
the family home. She was physically able to perform these added 
responsibilities. (R. 516-517.) 
7. On January 22, 1973, DaNiece first contacted defendant, 
Dr. Marian J. Haslam, regarding a total hip arthroplasty or 
replacement. He told her that the orthopedic surgeons were not 
recommending total hip arthroplasty surgery for individuals as 
young as DaNiece because they were concerned that the artificial 
hip components would wear out. He did, however, recommend that 
the metal plate and screws be removed. (R. 519, 777-778.) 
8. Dr. Haslam removed the metal plate and screws from 
Mrs. Mikkelsen's right thigh and hip in a hospitalization at 
McKay-Dee Hospital from February 13 through February 17, 1973. 
(R. 520, 770, 780.) 
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9. Dr. Haslam next saw DaNiece on February 4, 1974 at which 
time he recommended that a total hip arthroplasty procedure be 
performed. (R. 783.) 
10. Dr. Haslam performed the total hip arthroplasty 
procedure on DaNiece in a hospitalization at McKay-Dee Hospital 
extending from March 13 to March 23, 1974. (R. 520, 784.) 
11. Her recovery from the surgery was uncomplicated and she 
did remarkably well. (R. 520, 784.) 
12. Dr. Haslam performed another surgery which consisted of 
a wedge osteotomy on Mrs. Mikkelsen's right lower leg to 
straighten it out in a hospitalization extending from May 7 to May 
18, 1974, at McKay-Dee Hospital. (R. 521.) 
13. Prior to the total hip replacement surgery, Dr. Haslam 
never advised DaNiece regarding what her limitations would be and 
that this was strictly a walking device. (R. 521-522.) 
14. DaNiece continued to be examined by Dr. Haslam 
periodically throughout the summer of 1974. She was last examined 
by him and released on a P.R.N, (patient return as necessary) 
basis on September 17, 1974. (R. 524.) 
15. At the September 17, 1974 examination, when Dr. Haslam 
indicated he was going to release Mrs. Mikkelsen, she asked what 
limitations she would have, to which he replied she would have 
none. She asked if she could even ski and he responded she could 
ski, play tennis, and do whatever she wanted. He further stated 
that as light weight and small as she was, the artificial hip 
should last her a lifetime. (R. 525.) 
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16. Dr. Haslam did not set up any follow-up examinations, 
although he knew, and testified that he was aware of the fact, 
that an eventual breakdown of the methylmethacrylate cement used 
in the arthroplasty operation and bone resorption over the years 
were possibilities. (R. 525, 788, 820-821.) 
17. During the next five years, DaNiece was able to perform 
almost all of the activities of a normal person. She was able to 
do her house and yard work, and attend to the needs of her 
invalid husband. She was able to walk without a limp and do her 
work at a much faster pace than before her operation, without any 
pain. (R. 524.) 
18. In 1978 and 1979, she was employed at Fred M. Nye 
Company as a part-time clerk. (R. 525-527.) 
19. In February of 1979, DaNiece decided that she would like 
to take skiing lessons. On a Monday morning in early February, 
while at work, she advised Tina Besser, her supervisor, and 
Genevieve Craig, her co-worker, of her desire to take up skiing. 
Mrs. Besser responded that Mrs. Mikkelsen should first check with 
her doctor. DaNiece agreed. Thereupon, Mrs. Besser looked up 
Dr. Haslam's telephone number. Mrs. Mikkelsen dialed the number, 
reached Dr. Haslam, and asked him about skiing. Dr. Haslam 
responded that her "right hip was as strong, if not stronger, than 
her left hip", and "to go ahead and have a good time." 
(R. 527-529.) 
20. Genevieve Craig, a grandmother and great grandmother, 
verified the telephone call, and that portion of the call she 
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heard in Tina Besser's office. (Craig deposition of 6/10/86; 14f 
15.)* 
21. Following her telephone conversation with Dr. Haslamf 
DaNiece bought skiing equipmentf took skiing lessons, and went 
skiing 8 to 10 times in 1979f and again skied approximately 8 
to 10 times in 1980. (R. 530-531, 534.) 
22. On October 20, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Mikkelsen's daughter, 
Kathy, was married to Roger Meeker. Mrs. Mikkelsen had such high 
regard and trust in Dr. Haslam, she invited him and his wife to 
the wedding reception. Gary and DaNiece Mikkelsen, their 
daughter, Kathy and Gene Warren, an old family friend, all 
testified that Dr. Haslam expressed satisfaction with DaNiece's 
condition, and the fact she was able to ski, while he was at the 
wedding reception. (R. 532-534, 589-592, 648-650; Gene Warren 
deposition of 4/1/86; 6-8, 14-15.)* 
22. On March 2, 1980, Mrs. Mikkelsen went skiing with her 
daughter and son-in-law at Powder Mountain ski resort. While in 
the lift line for the Timberline/Drifter run, Mrs. Mikkelsen saw 
an old family friend and ski patrolman, Ken Herrick. 
Mrs. Mikkelsen called out to him and asked him to make a run with 
her in order to give her some instructions on her skiing. They 
got on the lift together. (R. 535, 609-611.) 
23. After getting off the lift, Mr. Herrick and 
Mrs. Mikkelsen were skiing very slowly down the beginner's slope 
so he could give her some suggestions. He was either skiing 
backwards in front of her or skiing slowly close to her so he 
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could watch her. (R. 537, 613-614.) 
24. Although it had snowed the previous night, the run where 
they were skiing was partially groomed and in excellent 
condition. (R. 536, 611.) 
25. After they had skied about one third of the way down 
the slope, as Mrs. Mikkelsen was in the process of making a snow 
plow turnf she felt and heard a definite pop, as if a branch had 
brokenf in her right hip, causing her to fall to the ground. She 
fell as a result of this pop in her right hip and not vice versa. 
(R. 537, 614.) 
26. Mrs. Mikkelsen was in excruciating pain and knew she had 
injured her right hip and leg. She was taken off the slope by 
toboggan and then taken by helicopter to St. Benedict's Hospital 
where her daughter and son-in-law worked. (R. 537-541, 614-861.) 
27. At St. Benedict's Hospital, Mrs. Mikkelsen received 
emergency treatment and became a patient of Dr. Jack W. Crosland. 
Dr. Crosland diagnosed her condition as "severe comminuted 
fracture of the proximal right femur around the cemented femoral 
component of the total hip replacement. . ." (R. 542-543; 
Dr. Crosland deposition of 5/4/82; 7-10.)* 
28. On March 5, 1980, Dr. Crosland performed surgery on 
Mrs. Mikkelsen's right leg and hip removing the femoral component 
of the total hip and placing a long metal rod down her femur to 
stabilize the fracture. In the operative report, he stated, 
After removal of the prosthesis and removal of 
the cement from the proximal femur, it was 
noted that the medial bone was in effect, just 
a very small shell that could be cracked just 
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by flicking it with a fingertip, (Emphasis 
added) 
He remarked in his depositionf which was read at the trial, 
"Dr. Allison was assisting. We found that the 
bone along the medial cortex of the 
femur—that would be on this film, this area 
right here—was paper thin..." (Emphasis 
added) 
(R. 78-79; Dr. Crosland deposition of 5/4/82; 13, 16-17.)* 
29. Mrs. Mikkelsen remained in St. Benedicts Hospital until 
March 21, 1980 and in Dr. Crosland's care until the later part of 
1980. (R. 545-546.) 
30. Dr. Harold K. Dunn, an orthopedic surgeon at the 
University of Utah Medical Center and a specialist in the field of 
joint replacement as well as in congenital hip abnormalities, 
assumed the care and treatment of Mrs. Mikkelsen. He removed the 
long metal rod on May 14, 1982. He has advised Mrs. Mikkelsen 
that she is not a candidate for a reimplantation of a total hip 
replacement and will remain in her current state for the rest of 
her life. (Dr. Dunn deposition of 8/16/84; 6-9.)* 
31. Since she has no hip joint and her bones are so weak, 
Mrs. Mikkelsen will need to use two crutches and/or a wheelchair 
the rest of her life. She runs a great risk of rebreaking the 
bone. She needs assistance with virtually every aspect of her day 
to day life. Her right leg is significantly shorter than her 
left, so she needs a two and one half inch shoe lift. She suffers 
significant pain. (R. 551-552; Dr. Dunn deposition of 8/16/84; 
11-12.)* 
32. Doctors Harold K. Dunn, Wallace E. Hess, Sherman 
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S. Coleman, Jack W. Crosland, and John P. Cranston all testified 
that it would have clearly been a departure from the standard of 
care of the orthopedic medical profession for a doctor not to 
advise a total hip patient that he or she should not ski, play 
tennis or jog, and not to make it very clear to the patient, even 
"hammer it into their brain"f that a total hip replacement is 
strictly a walking device. Certainly, if a patient called and 
asked if she could ski, it would be beneath the standard of care 
to tell her she could. (R. 680-686, 689-691, 876-878; Dr. Dunn 
deposition of 8/16/84; 17, 21, 26-27. Dr. Coleman deposition of 
6/12/86; 34- 35, 46, 50, 55. Dr. Crosland deposition of 5/4/82; 
38, 51-52, 55.)* 
33. Dr. Haslam testified that at various medical symposiums 
he had heard other orthopedic surgeons say that they had advised 
their patients that they could ski, play tennis, and participate 
in other athletic activities. Dr. Haslam also testified that he 
liked to give his patients "good encouragement. She had a good 
hip, I said go and enjoy a good hip. You're now pretty much back 
to normal." (R. 842-843, 855-856.) 
34. Dr. John P. Cranston, plaintiff's expert orthopedic 
surgeon, testified that the failure to closely monitor patients 
with total hip replacements, through yearly examinations and 
x-rays, particularly in Mrs. Mikkelsen's case, where she had, by 
September, 1974, undergone five major surgical procedures 
involving her hip, constituted a departure from the standard of 
care of the orthopedic medical profession as it then existed. 
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(R. 683, 687-689.) 
35. Mrs. Mikkelsen testified that at no time did Dr. Haslam 
sit down with her and go into detail with regard to the do's and 
don't's, and at no time did he ever tell her that her hip 
replacement was strictly a walking device. (R. 521-522.) 
Dr. Jack W. Crosland's and Dr. Harold K. Dunn's depositions 
were read to the jury, in lieu of their live testimony, by 
stipulation of counsel. Dr. Sherman Coleman's, Mrs. Genevieve 
Craig's and Mr. Gene Warren's depositions were video taped for 
use at trial and were shown to the jury. Citations above to these 
witnesses' testimonies are to the deposition page numbers. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The above entitled case was tried before a jury, commencing 
on the 23rd day of June, 1986, and concluding on the 1st day of 
July, 1986. The jury answered questions submitted by the court, 
and found the facts in plaintiff's favor on the issues of 
negligence and proximate cause. We rely on those findings and 
take the position that they are controlling with regard to the 
issues presented in this appeal. It should be noted, however, 
that the jury also found that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent "by skiing." The jury assessed defendant's negligence 
at 50% and plaintiff's negligence at 50%. Therefore, plaintiff 
did not recover. (See attached Appendix 1 - Judgment Upon Jury 
Verdict) 
The trial court submitted questions to the jury in its 
Special Verdict form. (See attached Appendix 2 - Special Verdict 
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Form) It is our position that the answers to said questions 
mandate a judgment in plaintiff's favor on the issue of liability, 
and a new trial on the issue of damages. 
Before discussing the answers to the questions in the Special 
Verdict, we call the Court's attention to certain exceptions to 
the trial court's proposed instructions taken by plaintiff's 
counsel before the jury commenced its deliberations. 
Counsel for plaintiff excepted to the failure of the court to 
give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 4, (See attached 
Appendix 3 - Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 4) which was 
plaintiff's requested instruction on liability, and went on to 
state in part: 
. . . for the court to fail to instruct 
specifically that plaintiff need not prove 
each and every act of negligence alleged in 
her complaint in order to prevail, but that if 
she proves one or more acts of negligence 
alleged in her complaint, she should pre-
vail. . . . (R.893.) 
Again, counsel excepted to failure of the court to give 
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 18 (See attached Appendix 4 
- Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 18) and again pointed out: 
. . . and here again, the instructions do 
not clearly specify that plaintiff's burden is 
not to prove each and every act of neglect 
alleged, but only one or more of the claimed 
acts of neglect alleged in order to prevail in 
the case. . . . (R. 896.) 
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and again, 
. . . the jury should be clearly advised and 
instructed that all plaintiff need do in order 
to prevail on the issue of liability/ would be 
to prove one or more of the claimed acts of 
neglect by a preponderance or greater weight 
of the evidence. . . (R. 896-897.) 
Againf counsel excepted to the court's Instruction 
No. 8f (See attached Appendix 5 - Court's Instruction No. 8) in 
part as follows: 
. . . the court says the proximate cause, 
and in this context/ we point out that the 
plaintiff/ under the facts and the evidence 
submitted in the case; is entitled to have submitted to the juryf 
at least three different acts of negligence, any one of which 
could be, if the jury was so inclined/ found to be a proximate 
cause. This instructIQfl would seem to yequjre plaintiff the 
burden of proving all three acts of neglect which are alleged/ in 
order to come out with the conclusion that the defendant's conduct 
was the proximate cause. (Emphasis added.) (R. 901-902.) 
Counsel for plaintiff requested Instruction No. 16f (See 
attached Appendix 6 - Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 16) on 
the issue of contributory negligence. Said requested instruction 
reads as follows: 
You are instructed that in the event you 
should find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant gave plaintiff medical 
advice that she could ski without suffering 
adverse physical risks to her total hip 
replacement/ then it would not be negligence 
on her part to undertake to ski. 
13 
The court refused to give said instruction. 
Again, with regard to the doctrine of assumption of 
riskf counsel requested Instruction No. 17. (See attached Appendix 
7 - Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 17) Said requested 
instruction reads as follows: 
You are instructed that defendant has alleged 
in his answer as a defense that plaintiff 
assumed the risks incident to her skiing 
activities. 
In this connection you are further instructed 
that plaintiff in legal contemplation cannot 
be held to have assumed the risks incident to 
her accident unless defendant proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
(1) that plaintiff was given medical 
advice before the accident that there was an 
unusual risk to her total hip replacement if 
she were to ski; and 
(2) that having knowledge of such risk 
she nevertheless undertook to ski and to 
assume said risk in disregard of said medical 
advice. 
The court refused to give said instruction. 
Counsel excepted to refusal of the court to give 
requested Instruction No. 17 (See attached Appendix 7 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 17) in the following 
language: 
. . . because it is the law that plaintiff 
cannot be held to assume a risk unless 
plaintiff has specific knowledge of the risk 
involved in assuming same. Here we have 
evidence in the case that the plaintiff was 
advised medically that she could, in fact, ski 
and have a good time without suffering unusual 
risk of harm, and if she was given such 
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advice, she couldn't be held to have assumed 
the risk involved as a result of taking that 
advice. (R. 896.) 
In excepting to the court's Instruction No. 1, (See 
attached Appendix 8 - Court's Instruction No. 7) counsel excepted 
to giving an instruction on assumption of risk/ but went on to say 
that if an instruction were to be given on the doctrine/ 
. . . the jury should be clearly advised and 
instructed that in order for plaintiff to 
assume a risk/ the risk must be clearly 
identified and foreseen by the party assuming 
samef and this instruction doesn't point out 
that distinction/ which I think the case law 
makes in Utah in this instruction. (R. 901.) 
In the conclusory exception taken by counsel for 
plaintiff for failure of the court to give plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 28 , (See attached Appendix 9 - Plaintiff's 
Requested Instruction No. 28) counsel stated in part: 
• . . Particularly/ the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence should not have been presented 
across the board/ in view of the fact that if 
the plaintiff were to prevail on the one claim 
of neglect/ i.e./ negligent instruction and 
advice that plaintiff could/ in fact, ski 
without suffering disproportionate risk to her 
body and person/ then, as a matter of law, on 
that issue, the doctrine of comparative 
negligence would be inappropriate. If 
plaintiff prevails that such instruction was 
given, then plaintiff's reliance upon that 
instruction and advice, as a matter of law, 
would withdraw the issue of comparative 
negligence, the issue of assumption of risk, 
the issue of contributory negligence from the 
case. (Emphasis added.) (R. 898f 899.) 
Questions No. lf 2f 3f 4f 5f and 6 and the answers made 
by the jury to all of said questions/ of the trial court's Special 
Verdict Form/ (See attached Appendix 2 - Trial Court's Special 
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Verdict Form) except for Question No. 5, read as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1; Was defendant negligent as alleged 
by plaintiff? (Emphasis added.) 
YES X 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 2: If your answer to Question No. 1 
is "yes"f was such negligence a cause of the injuries 
received by plaintiff? 
YES X 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 3: Was plaintiff negligent, 
or did she assume the risk of injuryf by 
skiing? (Emphasis added.) 
YES X 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 4: If your answer to 
Question No. 3 is "yes", was such negligence 
or assumption of risk a cause of the injuries 
sustained by plaintiff? 
YES X 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 5: Concerning only the 
evidence concerning damages and without being 
concerned with the effect of fault of either 
party on damages in answering this question, 
what amount of money would fairly and ade-
quately compensate plaintiff for injury 
sustained as a result of the accident of March 
2, 1980? 
GENERAL DAMAGES; $ 
SPECIAL DAMAGES: $. 
If you have answered Questions No. 1 and 2 and 
have found both plaintiff and defendant were 
negligent in a way that caused the injuries, 
answer the following question: 
QUESTION NO. 6: Considering all of the 
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negligence of plaintiff that you have found to 
be a cause of her injuries, and all of the 
negligence of defendant that you have found to 
be a cause of her injuries to total 100%, you 
will now allocate the 100% negligence between 
the parties. You will weight the negligence 
of each party against the other party and 
determine the relative negligence of each 
party in relation to the other. Your answer 
in percentages will reflect your decision. 
What part of that 100% do you find to be 
attributable to:? 
PLAINTIFF 5j)% 
DEFENDANT 5])% 
TOTAL 100% (R. 969-970.) 
From a cursory reading of Question No. 1, it is clear 
that the court placed the duty on plaintiff to establish all acts 
of negligence on the part of defendant, as alleged in Instruction 
No. 1. No other instruction sets forth plaintiff's allegations of 
negligence. In Instruction No. 1 the court stated in general 
terms the plaintiff's claim that Dr. Haslam was guilty of mal-
practice, and then, in paragraph 3, stated as follows: 
More specifically, plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant was negligent in the following: 
(1) In failing to properly advise 
DaNiece Mikkelsen in the limitations that 
should be placed on her physical activity in 
light of the nature of the prosthetic device 
and its fit in her leg and hip area. 
(2) In advising DaNiece Mikkelsen in 
early 1979 that she could go skiing when 
Dr. Haslam knew or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known that such activity 
could not be safely undertaken by a woman 
whose hip was in the condition that Dr. Haslam 
knew or should have known it to be in at the 
time of the advice. 
(3) In improperly advising 
Mrs. Mikkelsen that she could go skiing 
without appropriate follow-up examinations 
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sufficient to apprise himself of the condition 
that developed as a natural result of the 
surgery that was performed by Dr. Haslam. 
(4) In failing to perform physical and 
x-ray examinations on a regular basis of the 
hip and leg area where the total hip replace-
ment procedure was performed in the months and 
years following such procedure. (Emphasis 
added.) 
When the jury unanimously found that Dr. Haslam had 
committed the acts of negligence alleged by plaintiff in Instruc-
tion No. 1, and that said negligence was a cause of plaintiff's 
injuries, it became an undisputed fact in this case that plain-
tiff's appearance on the slope and her tragic accident was the 
result of defendant's negligence. 
Although the jury, in answer to Question No. 3, found 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and/or 
assumption of risk by skiing, and, in answer to Questions No. 4 
and 6, that such negligence and/or assumption of risk was a cause 
of the accident, contributing to plaintiff's injuries to the 
degree of 50%, these findings became irrelevant, and should 
not have been considered in this case. The authorities we cite in 
this brief will support this flat-out statement. 
In sum, the jury has found that defendant negligently 
failed to advise Mrs. Mikkelsen as to her physical limitations, 
negligently advised her that she could ski, negligently gave her 
such advice without giving her a physical and x-ray examination, 
and negligently failed to adopt a regular physical and x-ray 
examination procedure for her as follow-up treatment. 
The testimony of all witnesses makes it clear that 
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Mrs* Mikkelsen had total confidence in Dr. Haslam as her physician 
and surgeon, right down to the date of her accident. The wedding 
reception puts at rest any possible claim to the contrary. 
In addition we point out that there was absolutely no 
evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was in any way 
negligent in the manner in which she was skiing at the time of the 
accident. 
Before the jury was dismissed, the following dialogue 
occurred between the court and counsel: 
The Court: Four is yes. And six, in the 
apportion for negligence, they have 50/50, and 
thereupon, made no answer to five. Theoreti-
cally and technically, I suppose they should. 
Do you want me to send them back in? 
Mr. Campbell: No, I don't request that. 
Ms. Diana: I would request that. 
The Court: Pardon. 
Ms. Diana: I would request that. 
Mr. Campbell: I'll submit. 
The Court: I don't see that it's going to do 
any good. 
Mr. Campbell: It would obviously take some 
time. I don't know. 
The Court: I don't see that it makes any 
difference. 
Ms. Diana: I'll just put it on the record 
that that request was made. (R. 970.) 
The court dismissed the jury without requiring it to 
answer Question No. 5 on damages. 
The jury has clearly found in answer to Question No. 1 
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that Dr. Haslam was negligent in advising DaNiece Mikkelsen that 
she could ski. We take the position that her trust in her doctor 
placed her on the slope. Because of the aforesaid clinching fact, 
the jury's further finding that Mrs. Mikkelsen was contributorily 
negligent and assumed the risk of injury by virtue of the fact 
that she took Dr. Haslam's advice and placed her trust in him is 
legally inappropriate. The only acceptable conclusion resulting 
from the jury's findings is that defendant is liable for plain-
tiff's injuries. The single issue remaining for determination in 
this case is that of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY HAS FOUND THAT DEFENDANT NEGLIGENTLY 
GAVE PLAINTIFF ADVICE THAT SHE COULD SKIf AND 
THAT THE GIVING OF SAID ADVICE WAS A CAUSE OF 
HER INJURIES. IT THEREFORE FOLLOWS THAT 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
CEASED TO BE POSSIBLE DEFENSES, AND THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT IN HER FAVOR 
ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY. 
As we have pointed out, the answers to Questions No. 1 
and 2 establish that defendant was guilty of the negligencer as 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and that said negligence was a 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. Thusf it has become established 
fact that defendant negligently advised plaintiff that she 
could ski. 
Question No. 3, however, allowed the jury to find that 
plaintiff was herself negligent and/or assumed the risk of injury 
by virtue of the very act of skiing! 
The controlling case law cited in this memorandum 
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abundantly supports the proposition that the answers to Questions 
No. 3f 4, and 6, should be disregarded and judgment in plaintiff's 
favor on the issue of liability should be entered. 
Some of the cases we cite discuss claimed defenses of 
contributory negligence where patients have been injured as a 
result of following their physicians' instructions. Other of the 
cases we cite discuss the claimed defense of assumption of risk, 
where a patient has followed a treating physician's instruc-
tions. Most of the cases lump contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk together, and hold that neither is a defense 
where it can be demonstrated that an injury resulted from follow-
ing a physician's advice. 
In Schoonover v. Holden, 87 N.W. 737, 48 C.J. 1135, 
(IW. 1901), a patient brought an action against his physician for 
malpractice. From a verdict in favor of plaintiff, defendant 
appealed. It appeared that plaintiff had suffered a dislocation 
of the knee joint and that defendant had assured plaintiff that 
the dislocation had been reduced, when in fact it hadn't. The 
court held that it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury 
that it was the duty of plaintiff to use all reasonable efforts to 
prevent the injury resulting from continued use of the knee, and 
that the jury might consider the knowledge of the plaintiff as to 
the condition of her leg, after the defendant had told her that it 
was reduced, and to consider whether she had made any effort to 
determine the correctness of the doctor's conclusions by calling 
in other physicians, since she had a right to rely on the pro-
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fessional skill of the defendant. 
The court stated: 
Our attention is called to an instruction 
asked by the defendant and refused. It is as 
follows: "It is the duty of the party injured 
to use all reasonable efforts upon their part, 
so far as possible/ to prevent damages from 
resulting therefrom. And, if they do not do 
so, they cannot recover for such damages or 
injury as they might have thus prevented. 
Upon this branch of the case you are in-
structed that you may take into consideration 
the knowledge, if any, the plaintiff has shown 
to have had of the injury complained of; her 
knowledge, if any, as to the condition of her 
limb after the defendant had told her that it 
was reduced, and whether or not she made any 
efforts to determine whether her conclusions 
were correct, and, if she did, whether or not 
she acted upon the knowledge she had thus 
obtained, by calling other physicians, and 
having the dislocation complained of in the 
case reduced." This instruction was properly 
refused, because it required the plaintiff to 
determine whether the defendant was giving her 
injury necessary treatment. She had the right 
to rely upon his professions of skill as a 
physician, without calling others in to 
determine whether he really possessed it or 
not, and she was not bound to call other 
physicians unless she was fully aware that he 
had not been and was not properly treating her 
injury. The defendant himself says that his 
treatment thereof was the usual and ordinary 
treatment in such cases, and the evidence 
conclusively shows that the plaintiff was 
assured by him that he had reduced the 
dislocation, and that she was receiving 
approved treatment. The court in its own 
instructions gave the jury the correct rule as 
to her contributory negligence, and this was 
sufficient. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
87 N.W. at 737. 
In Halverson v. Zimmerman, 232 N.W. 754, (N.D. 1930), 
plaintiff brought a malpractice action against a treating physi-
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cian. It appeared that plaintiff had injured his left shoulder in 
an automobile accident. The doctor sent him home telling him that 
his shoulder would be all right but that it would take a long time 
healing. It turned out that the shoulder was dislocated and 
plaintiff ended up with a permanent injury. Plaintiff received a 
verdict. Defendant appealed, claiming that plaintiff was himself 
guilty of contributory negligence. The court, in sustaining the 
verdict for plaintiff, pointed out that, 
. . . the action of the plaintiff in calling 
at the clinic and paying the bill indicates 
that he still had confidence in the defendant 
and supposed that the treatment he had 
received up to that time was proper and that 
he was legally obligated to pay for it. 
(Emphasis added.) 
232 N.W. at 758. 
The court went on to state: 
[5] It is not a part of the duties of a 
patient to distrust his physician, or to set 
his judgment against that of the expert whom 
he has employed to treat him, or to appeal to 
other physicians to ascertain if the physician 
is performing his duty properly. The very 
relation assumes trust and confidence on the 
part of the patient in the capacity and skill 
of the physician; and it would indeed require 
an unusual state of facts to render a person 
who is possessed of no medical skill guilty of 
contributory negligence because he accepts the 
word of his physician and trusts in the 
efficacy of the treatment prescribed by him. 
A patient has the right to rely on the 
professional skill of his physician, without 
calling others in to determine whether he 
really possesses such skill or not. The 
patient is not bound to call in other physi-
cians r unless he becomes fully aware that the 
physician has not been, and is not, giving 
proper treatment. Schoonover v. Holden (Iowa) 
87 N.W. 737; 48 C.J, p. 1135. 
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The situation disclosed by the evidence 
in this case is quite different from that 
disclosed in the various cases cited by the 
appellant. In those cases there was either a 
deliberate disregard or violation of the 
Physiclaols direction? on the part of the 
patient, or failure to obtain proper treatment 
after the patient had been advised by other 
competent physicians that he was in need of 
such treatment. No such condition is shown to 
exist in this case. We are agreed that upon 
the record presented here the trial court was 
correct in denying defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict and in refusing to give the 
requested instructions. In its charge to the 
jury the trial court, however, instructed as 
follows: 
"Even though you find from the evidence 
that the defendant physician was at fault and 
liable to the plaintiff for any damage under 
all the instructions of the court, you are 
further instructed that the defendant is not 
responsible to the plaintiff in this action 
for any injury or aggravation of injury which 
you might find under the evidence that 
plaintiff may have brought upon himself by 
want of ordinary care, or his failure to do 
what an ordinarily prudent person under like 
circumstances would do to avoid injury, 
aggravation of injury, suffering, loss or 
damage." 
In view of the absence of any substantial 
evidence tending to show contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff, this 
instruction was error against the plaintiff 
rather than against the defendant. 
232 N.W. at 759. 
In Kelly v. Carroll, et ux., 219 P.2d 79, (Wash. 1950), 
plaintiff received a verdict in a malpractice action which was 
affirmed. Defendant was a drugless healer. He gave advice to the 
patient, who was suffering from appendicitis, not to have an 
operation. The patient died. The claim of defense was that the 
patient and his wife were contributorily negligence and assumed 
24 
the risk in taking said advice. The court stated the general rule 
as follows: 
[23] On the question of contributory negli-
gence , in such cases as the one at barf it is 
the law that "It is not a part of the duties 
of a patient to distrust his physician, or to 
set his judgment against that of the expert 
whom he has employed to treat him, or to 
appeal to other physicians to ascertain if the 
physician is performing his duty properly. 
The very relation assumes trust and confidence 
on the part of the patient in the capacity and 
skill of the physician; and it would indeed 
require an unusual state of facts to render a 
person who is possessed of no medical skill 
guilty of contributory negligence because he 
accepts the word of his physician and trusts 
in the efficacy of the treatment prescribed by 
him. A patient has the right to rely on the 
professional skill of his physician, without 
calling others in to determine whether he 
really possesses such skill or not. The 
patient is not bound to call in other physi-
cians , unless he becomes fully aware that the 
physician has not been, and is not, giving 
proper treatment. Schoonover v. Holden, Iowa, 
87 N.W. 737; 48 C.J, p. 1135." Halverson 
v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 232 N.W. 754, 759. 
219 P.2d at 90. 
In Largess v. Tatem, et al., 130 Vt. 280, 291 A.2d 398, 
(1972), plaintiff brought an action against defendant alleging 
negligent treatment of a hip fracture sustained by her. The case 
was tried by the court without a jury. The court entered judgment 
for plaintiff, holding that plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent for following a course of activity which defendant had 
permitted and even encouraged during her hospital stay. With 
regard to defendant's claim that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent in undertaking full weight bearing and use of her hip 
after her operation the court stated: 
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[11] The defendant seeks to fault the 
plaintiff not for violating post-operative 
advice but for following a course of conduct 
which he permitted and even encouraged during 
her hospital stay. To label her actions 
negligence would ignore the doctor-patient 
relationship and place a higher standard of 
expertise upon the patient than that exercised 
by the doctor. It seems unrealistic to claim 
that this plaintiff while in the hands of her 
doctor is permitted to walk unassisted by any 
supportive device, but when she does so at 
home such actions become negligence. The 
trial court found no evidence of contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff and 
neither do we. 
The doctrine of assumption of the risk of 
injury is well set forth in Killary v. Bur-
lington-Lake Champlain Chamber of Commerce/ 
123 Vt. 256, 262-266, 186 A.2d 170 (1962), and 
cases cited therein. Such defense in the case 
here is totally unsupported by the evidence. 
291 A.2d at 403. 
In Fairchild v. Brian, et al., 354 So.2d 675, 
(La. 1977), spouses brought action to recover against an optome-
trist for alleged negligence resulting in loss of vision in wife's 
right eye. The trial court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered an award of 
$25f000.00. The court held on the issue of contributory negli-
gence that the wife was not contributorily negligent in failing to 
seek further medical attention until after she could not see out 
of her eye. 
The court stated: 
[2] Defendants/ in the alternativef aver that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in 
failing to seek the proper medical attention 
that a reasonable person would have sought 
under the circumstances. We do not find 
plaintiff contributorily negligent because she 
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had been reassured as to what her trouble was 
and had been led to believe that a qualified 
medical doctor had diagnosed her problem to be 
cataract which could become progressively 
worse and eventually corrected by surgery, 
354 So.2d at 680. 
In Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555f (D.C. 1979), an 
action for medical malpractice against a nationally certified 
medical technician, the trial court entered judgment for defen-
dants and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed. One 
of the reasons set forth as a ground for reversal was that the 
trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider the issue of 
assumption of risk. It appeared that defendant was administering 
a "urethral smear test" on plaintiff by having plaintiff stand 
while a cotton swab was inserted about a quarter-inch into his 
penis. After the first administration of the swab, plaintiff felt 
faint, was asked whether he could go ahead with the test, and 
indicated that he could. A second test was administered, where-
upon plaintiff fainted, striking his head on a metal blood 
pressure stand and on the tile floor, and was severely injured. 
The court, in holding as a matter of law that assumption of risk 
was not an issue, stated: 
[16,17] Although the defense of assump-
tion of risk has been applied in a wide 
variety of circumstances to defeat negligence 
claims, the defense has rarely been sustained 
in actions involving professional negligence. 
Most courts and commentators have explained 
this phenomenon by quite properly noting that 
the disparity in knowledge between profes-
sionals and their clientele generally pre-
cludes recipients of professional services 
from knowing whether a professional's conduct 
is in fact negligent. See Largess v. Tatem, 
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130 Vt.271, 280, 291 A.2d 398, 403 (1972). 
Cf. O'Neal v. State, 66 Misc.2d 936, 323 
N.Y.S.2d 56, 61 (1971); Martineau v. Nelson, 
311 Minn. 92. 247 N.W.2d 409, 417 (1976) (con-
tributory negligence). See generally D. 
Louisell _& H. Williamsr Medical Malpractice 
Section 9.02 (1977); D. Harney, Medical 
Malpractice, Section 7®2 at 243 (1973); 
R. Mallen & V. Levett, Legal Malpractice 
Section 173 at 226 (1977). In the context of 
medical malpractice, the superior knowledge of 
the dggtpr with big expertise in medical 
matters and the generally limited ability of 
the patient to ascertain the existence of 
certain risks and dangers that inhere in 
certain medical treatments, negates the 
critical elements of the defense, i.e., 
knowledge and appreciation of the risk.—Thus, 
save for exceptional circumstances, a patient 
cannot assume the risk of negligent treat-
ment. See Hales v. Rainesy 162 Mo.App. 46, 
141 S.W. 917 (1911). 
[18f19] Moreover, the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship, which requires 
the patient to rely on the learning and 
judgment of the doctors, often precludes a 
finding that the doctor owed no duty to the 
patient. Clearly, because of the doctorfs 
ability to understand and interpret medical 
matters, the doctor generally owes a greater 
duty to his patient than the patient owes to 
himself. See Martineau v. Nelson, supra, 247 
N.W.2d at 417; Largess v. Tatem, supra 130 
Vt. at 280, 291 A.2d at 403. See also Note, 
21 Clev.St.L.Rev. 58, 59 (1972); Note, 12 
Clev.Mar.L.Rev. 455 (1963). As one court has 
stated: 
Patients desirous of obtaining 
medical attention are not re-
sponsible for diagnosing their own 
ailments. They assist the doctor by 
describing their complaints and it 
is incumbent upon the trained and 
skilled physician to isolate 
the nature of the patient's illness 
within a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty. fO'Neal v. 
State, supra, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 61.] 
Because of the considerable duty that the 
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doctor owes the patient/ proof of the pa-
tient's knowledge is the sine qua non of the 
defense of assumption of the risk in medical 
malpractice. Accordingly, in the few deci-
sions in which the defense has been sustained, 
the patient was specifically warned about a 
risk, and refused to follow the doctor's 
instructions. See, e.g., Levett v. Etkind, 
supra (patient who refused assistance in 
disrobing and subsequently fell assumed tfre 
risk); Deblanc v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 
207 So.2d 868 (La.App.1968) (patient specifi-
cally warned not to leave bed without assis-
tance assumed the risk of falling); Munson 
v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital, 186 
Neb. 778, 186 N.W.2d 492 (1971) (patient who 
was repeatedly warned not to leave bed without 
assistance assumed the risk of falling). 
[20] While a patient's comprehension of 
the risk appears to be the crucial element of 
the defense in medical malpractice cases, it 
is by no means dispositive since a defendant 
must also show that the plaintiff's acquies-
cence in that risk was voluntary. See King 
v. Solomon, 323 Mass. 326, 81 N.E.2d 838 
(1948); Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe, 58 
N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1954). It follows 
that the mere fact that the plaintiff re-
quested a particular treatment is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirement of voluntary 
consent. See Louisell & Williams, supra 
Section 9.02, at 243 n.15. The defendant must 
show that his assent to the patient's request 
in a particular treatment is consistent with 
the proper exercise of medical judgment. 
[21] Typically, the determination as to 
whether or not a plaintiff assumed the risk is 
a question of fact usually to be determined by 
the jury under proper instruction from the 
court. Willis v. Stewart, supra at 818. See 
Restatement (Second) Torts, supra Section 496 
D, at 595 (1965) : Prosser, supra Section 68, 
at 477. Where, however, there is no evidence 
from which a reasonable juror could find that 
the plaintiff assumed the risk, the question 
is one of law for the court. See Harris 
v. Plummer, supra at 100; Aylor v. Intercounty 
Construction Corp., 127 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 
155, 381 F.2d 930, 934 (1967): Capital Transit 
Co. v. Bingman, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 76, 212 
29 
F.2d 241, 242 (1954). In our view this is 
such a case. 
[22] The record is devoid of any 
evidence indicating that appellant was aware 
of any risk associated with the test. Even if 
a jury could reasonably conclude that he 
recognized the causal connection between the 
test and his feeling of faintness, there was 
no evidence that he did not properly rely upon 
the expertise of the technician in concluding 
that if he felt better# the faintness was only 
temporary and that the test could safely 
proceed. Since the sine qua non of the 
doctrine is the voluntary assumption of known 
risk, it was error for this issue to go to the 
jury. 
Reversed. 
407 A.2d at 565 to 568. 
The Utah Supreme Court is in accord with the philosophy 
of the above cited cases under a variety of situations where a 
claimed defense of assumption of risk has been under consider-
ation. 
In Evans v. Stuart, 17 Utah.2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 
(1966), an action was filed against a farm owner for the wrongful 
death of an employee. The trial court, as trier of the fact, 
entered judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming that 
the trial court had erred in finding that assumption of risk was 
not a defense. Here, defendant had instructed deceased to burn up 
weeds and growth to clean out an irrigation ditch. After the fire 
had been started by decedent, the wind changed and decedent was 
killed. 
The court stated: 
This further should be said in regard to the 
defense of assumption of risk. It is not 
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identical with but is closely related to 
contributory negligence. To invoke it and 
preclude recovery there must be a voluntary 
assumption of the risk of a known danger where 
one has an opportunity to make an alternative 
choice. Relevant to that issue here is the 
fact that it is not only the dutyy but it is 
usually the desire of a conscientious employ-
ee, to be obedient to the directions of his 
employer. For this reasonr it is usually held 
that when an employee is acting in compliance 
with the orders of his superior he should not 
be deemed to have voluntarily assumed the risk 
of harm. 
410 P.2d at 1002. 
In Johnson v. Hartvigson, 13 Utah.2d 322, 373 P.2d 908, 
(1962), plaintiff brought an action against a driver for injuries 
sustained when an automobile's brakes failed, going down a hill, 
and the automobile ran into a tree. The court entered judgment on 
a jury verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed, claiming error 
in submitting issues of contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk to the jury. Defendant admitted to having some brake trouble 
two or three days before the accident. The key testimony was that 
the driver advised plaintiff that the driver was having trouble 
with the brakes and intended to run into the tree, and the 
passenger responded, "Go ahead." 
The court stated: 
Submission of the issue of assumption of 
risk cannot be justified unless there is some 
foundation in the evidence upon which such a 
finding could properly rest. It must appear 
that there was a situation which was clearly 
observable to be dangerous; of which the 
plaintiff was aware; and that she voluntarily 
consented to assume the risk of such danger. 
We are unable to discover any foundation 
whatsoever in the evidence that would support 
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a finding that the plaintiff had any knowledge 
of the seriously defective condition of the 
defendant's brakes, nor that she did or said 
anything to indicate that she voluntarily 
assumed any such risk, 
373 P.2d at 910. See also Ojifusa v. National Housewares, Inc., 
24 Utah.2d 219f 469 P.2d 7, (1970). 
A case directly in point on both the issues of contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk is the much discussed and 
analyzed case of Los Alamos Medical Center, Inc. v. Coef et al.# 
58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175, 50 ALR.2d 1033, (N.M. 1954). Here the 
medical center brought an action to collect a medical bill and the 
patient and her husband cross-complained alleging physician 
malpractice in administering and prescribing morphine in such 
amounts as to cause the patient's addiction. Cross defendants 
denied negligence and pleaded contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk as defenses. A judgment on a verdict against the 
physician was affirmed by the New Mexico Supreme Court, supporting 
a holding that the patient could not be charged with contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk. 
Appellant urges that appellees are guilty 
of contributory negligence and assumed the 
risk incident to the use of the morphine by 
them. We find the rule stated thusly at 41 Am 
Jur (Physicians & Surgeons) Section 80: 
"Negligence of the patient, to 
constitute a bar to the suit, must 
have been an active and efficient 
contributing cause of the injury; it 
must have been simultaneous and 
co-operating with the fault of the 
defendant, must have entered into 
the creation of the cause of action, 
and have been an element in the 
transaction which constituted it. 
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Where the fault of the patient was 
subsequent to the fault of the 
physician and merely aggravated 
the injury inflicted by the physi-
cian , it only affects the amount of 
the damages recoverable by the 
patient. Since the patient may rely 
on the directions of his physician, 
it follows that he incurs no 
liability by doing so. . . . " 
The evidence is clear that Mrs. Coe in 
order to get a prescription/ frequently 
complained of pain when no pain was present. 
She testified she used it at the last for the 
jitters and for nervousness, at other times 
just to feel good. But being fearful of its 
harmful effectsf appellees contacted appellant 
as to the consequences of using too much 
morphine and were told by him not to worry in 
this regard as Mrs. Coe was improving physi-
cally and that she could be given morphine 
whenever she felt the need of it. Appellees 
testified they relied upon the instructions of 
appellant in this regard. Obviously they had 
a right to rely upon his superior knowledge. 
In King v. Solomon, 323 Mass 326, 81 NE2d 838, 
840, 8 ALR2d 1, that court disposed of a 
similar contention in the following language: 
"It could not be ruled as 
matter of law that the plaintiff Eva 
King was guilty of contributory 
negligence, or that she assumed 
the risk of addiction. It is true 
that she knew she was getting the 
injections, and that eventually she 
sought them, and she testified 
that by about the last of July she 
was "beginning to get a little 
sneaky — starting to lie1 and did 
not always tell the defendant 
the truth about her condition. She 
also testified that she did not know 
what the defendant was giving her, 
although in July she had a msuspi-
cion,1 and she knew it was something 
that was relieving her and making 
her feel "pretty high.1 From this 
together with other evidence that 
need not be stated, the jury could 
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have found that she knew she 
was getting morphine, but they were 
not obliged so to find. Much less 
were they obliged to find that she 
knew at what point addiction would 
begin, or that at any time before 
addiction became a fact she had 
ceased to rely upon the superior 
knowledge of the defendant as to the 
amount of the drug that could safely 
be taken over a given period of 
time. There was medical evidence 
that a person could become addicted 
'without knowing it.1" 
In Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash.2d 482, 219 
P2d 79, 90, 19 ALR2d 1174, in the course of 
the opinion the court said: 
"On the question of contri-
butory negligence in such cases as 
the one at bar, it is the law that 
'It is not a part of the duties 
of a patient to distrust his 
physician, or to set his judgment 
against that of the expert whom he 
has employed to treat him or to 
appeal to other physicians to 
ascertain if the physician is 
performing his duty properly. 
The very relation assumes trust and 
confidence on the part of the 
patient in the capacity and skill of 
the physician; and it would indeed 
require an unusual state of facts to 
render a person who is possessed of 
no medical skill guilty of contri-
butory negligence because he 
accepts the word of his physician 
and trusts in the efficacy of the 
treatment prescribed by him. A 
patient has the right to rely on the 
professional skill of his physician, 
without calling others in to 
determine whether he really pos-
sesses such skill or not. The 
patient is not bound to call in 
other physicians, unless he becomes 
fully aware that the physician has 
not been, and is not giving, 
proper treatment.'" 
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275 P.2d at 179-180. 
See also Martineauy et al. v. Nelson, 247 N.W.2d 409, 
(Mn. 1976); Wells v. Woman's Hospital Foundation, 286 So.2d 439f 
(La. 1973); Santoni v. Moodie, et al., 452 A.2d 1223, (Md. 1982). 
POINT II 
IN VIEW OF THE JURY'S FINDING THAT DR. HASLAM 
GAVE MRS. MIKKELSEN ADVICE THAT SHE COULD SKI 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER 
THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS NO. 3, 4, AND 6. 
In the case at bar plaintiff testified unequivocally 
that she was advised by defendant that she could ski. This 
testimony was supported by the testimony of other witnesses. 
Defendant didn't recall discussing skiing with plaintiff at any 
time, one way or the other. The jury has found in plaintiff's 
favor on the issue of advice given. 
The uncontroverted testimony was that at the time of the 
accident plaintiff was skiing very cautiously on a gentle begin-
ner's slope under the instructions of a professional ski in-
structor; that her instructor was either skiing backwards, and 
watching her make her turns, or was skiing alongside her; when a 
sharp popping sound occured, after which she fell. This is the 
only evidence concerning plaintiff's accident. There is no 
evidence that would support a finding that she was negligent in 
the manner in which she was skiing. 
In Marshall v. Ogden Railway and Depot Company, 221 P.2d 
868, (Utah 1950), plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries 
suffered while in the course of his employment with Southern 
Pacific Railway Company as a pullman porter. He was standing 
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alongside a pullman car when an employee of defendant drove a 
tractor, pulling some baggage cars, in such manner as to corner 
another baggage car, pushing the cars into plaintiff. From a 
verdict of no cause of action the plaintiff appealed, claiming 
that an instruction allowing the jury to determine that plaintiff 
was himself guilty of contributory negligence was error. The 
court agreed and reversed. Justice Latimer, in a special con-
currence, set forth a proposition of law that we think is material 
here, i.e. that where there is no evidentiary basis for a claim of 
contributory negligence it is reversible error to instruction upon 
same. The special concurrence states: 
If we review the incidents immediately 
prior to the accident, the place selected by 
the plaintiff appeared safe and if it became 
either hazardous or dangerous this condition 
was brought about by the driver of the truck. 
Plaintiff was apprised of the fact that the 
truck was to be driven past the place where he 
was standing; and, while this information 
amounted to warning the plaintiff to be 
observant of the truck's movements, in view of 
other facts and circumstances, it hardly 
suggested that by standing fast he was 
remaining in a place where injury would likely 
occur. Subsequent events established that by 
not moving he was struck by the trailer, but 
he is only chargeable with ordinary care and 
whether he exercised that degree of care is 
not tested by hindsight. 
The questioned instruction seems to 
suggest that the jury could find the plaintiff 
was negligent because he was standing in a 
dangerous and perilous place? he knew the 
dangers that existed; and with full knowledge 
of the hazards he voluntarily chose to 
remain. The facts do not justify the sub-
mission of such a theory. As previously 
suggested, if the place was dangerous it was 
made so by the driving of defendant's agent 
and when that condition was created plaintiff 
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had little, if any, opportunity to select a 
more secure place. Moreover. that theory 
suggests to the jury a distorted version of 
the facts. It portrays the plaintiff as a 
person with full knowledge of the situation 
who has been given a choice of selecting 
between an island of safety and a position of 
grave danger. The jurors are then told that 
if they believe he voluntarily chose the 
latter he cannot recover, I can not find in 
the record a voluntary choice of a known 
danger, 
221 P.2d at 872-873. See also Lee v, Zaske, et al., 6 N.W.2d 793 
(Mn. 1942). 
Under Utah case law contributory negligence is an 
affirmative defense. If defendant claims said defense it is 
defendants duty to both plead and prove same with specificity. 
In the absence of such proof it would be error on the part of the 
trial court to allow the jury to consider said defense. 
In Linden, Admx. v. The Anchor Mining Co.f 20 Utah 134, 
58 P. 355, (Utah 1899), the trial court instructed the jury that 
plaintiff had the burden of proving "that the decedent James 
Linden, was killed by reason and because of the unsafe condition 
of the drift chute in question, and without any fault on his part 
and while he was taking due and proper care for his own safety." 
From a verdict for defendant, plaintiff appealed, citing the 
giving of said instruction as error. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and held that the burden of proof on the issue of 
contributory negligence had been improperly shifted onto the 
shoulders of plaintiff to prove decedent's freedom from 
contributory negligence. This was held to be error. We invite 
the court to read this old and interesting case in its entirety. 
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The court concluded: 
Where the facts proved by the plaintiff do 
not/ upon their face show negligence in the 
plaintifff the opposing partyf if he relies 
upon the acts of negligence/ must show it. 
20 Utah at 144. Citing cases. 
The leading Utah case discussing contributory negligence 
in an action against a doctor for medical malpractice is Everts 
v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238f 197 P. 1043/ (1921). Plaintiff/ a minorf 
through his guardian ad litem/ filed a complaint alleging that 
defendant was negligent in failing and neglecting to give plain-
tiff proper instructions and advice as to the true nature of the 
condition from which plaintiff was suffering and as to follow-up 
treatment he should receive for an acne condition. There was 
evidence that plaintiff was suffering from syphilis. Defendant 
alleged contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff and his 
guardian ad litem as a defense. The court/ in instructing on 
contributory negligence/ did not particularize the elements of 
contributory negligence necessary of proof "applicable to the 
case" in order for defendant to prevail on said defense. From a 
judgment for defendant plaintiff appealed. The case was reversed 
for the reason that the trial court's instruction on contributory 
negligence was abstract and did not give the jury necessary 
guidelines "applicable to the case" in order for defendant to 
prevail/ and for the further reason that the undisputed facts 
revealed that the patient had not been informed by his physician 
of the dangers to which he might be exposed as a result of certain 
acts and omissions on his part. The giving of an instruction on 
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contributory negligence in general terms was held to be reversible 
The court stated: 
The law may therefore be correctly stated in 
an instruction, when abstractly considered, 
but mayf nevertheless, be faulty in that the 
law as stated may not be applicable to the 
case, 
197 P. at 1046. And again, 
In the case of Carpenter v. Black, 60 
Barb. (N.Y.) 488 (affirmed in 75 N.Y. 12), the 
court, in passing on the question of contri-
butory negligence on the part of the patient/ 
in the course of the opinion, at page 521 of 
60 Barb. (N.Y.), said: 
"If there was any [negligence], 
it was the result of ignorance on 
the part of the plaintiff, as to how 
the limb should be treated; that 
ignorance, it was the duty of the 
defendant to remove by giving her 
such instructions as to its care, as 
would enable her not only to 
prevent injury, but to treat it so 
as to facilitate cure." 
And again, 
It is no doubt wholesome law that a 
patient must obey the instructions of his 
physician, and if he fails to do so must 
suffer the consequences. Where the patient, 
however, is not informed of his actual 
condition and the dangers to which he may 
become exposed, and is left in ignorance 
respecting that matter, and by reason of such 
ignorance falls into error, or, figuratively 
speaking, walks from a precipice in the 
darkness of night, he should be judged only in 
the light of what he knew, or, in view of the 
facts and circumstances, should have known. 
The law charges him constantly with what he 
ought to have known in view of all the 
circumstances. 
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In view, therefore/ of the peculiar 
circumstances of this case, and for the reason that the 
defendant did not inform the plaintiff respecting the 
dangers to which he, through certain acts or omissions 
on his part, might become exposed, and in view of the 
fact that the court's instruction in question was 
not applicable to this case, we feel constrained to 
hold, and do hold, that the court erred in giving the 
instruction in the general language in which it was 
given. 
197 P. at 1048. 
We call the court's attention once again to the fact 
that in Interrogatory No. 1 the jury was necessarily referred to 
Instruction No. 1 to determine the claim of negligence as alleged 
by plaintiff. However, when it came to Question No. 3, with 
regard to the defense of contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk, the jury was only requested to answer the simple question of 
whether plaintiff was negligent, . . . or assumed the risk of 
injury, by skiing. Thus, it can be seen that Question No. 3 was 
not tailored to the facts of the case. The jury finding of 
contributory negligence and/or assumption of risk cannot stand in 
the face of the fact that the jury has found that advice was given 
by defendant to plaintiff that she could ski and the further fact 
that such advice has been found to have been a cause of plain-
tiff's injuries. The answers to Questions No. 1 and 2 are 
dispositive of the case. The jury was allowed to find that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk, based 
solely on the barren fact that plaintiff was "skiing". This 
finding has no supportable factual or legal foundation. The 
answers to Interrogatories No. 3, 4, and 6 must, therefore, be 
disregarded. See again Everts v. Worrell, supra. 
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POINT III 
WHERE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE MADE BY THE JURY 
WHICH ARE DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE OF LIA-
BILITY, AND THE ONLY ISSUE REMAINING IS THE 
ISSUE OF DAMAGES, THE PROPER REMEDY IS FOR 
THIS COURT TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES 
ONLY. 
In the case at bar the jury has found that defendant 
gave plaintiff advice that she could ski and "have a good time." 
This is the pivotal fact around which this case revolves. 
It is settled law that a finding properly made by the 
trier of the facts should not be reversed if there is credible 
evidence to support it. See Dyson v. Gulf Modular Corporation, 
338 So.2d 1385, (La. 1976); Canter v. Kochring Company, 283 So.2d 
716, (La. 1973). 
Annot., 29 ALR.2d 1199f is entitled "Propriety of 
Limiting to Issue of Damages Alone New Trial Granted on Ground 
of Inadequacy of Damages Awarded." The annotator states: 
With the few exceptions noted under the 
heading "Contrary viewf" infra, it is univer-
sally recognized and held either with or 
without a pertinent statute or rule of court, 
that a new trial granted on the ground of the 
inadequacy of the damages awarded may in a 
proper case be limited to the issue of damages 
only. 
Thus, it is generally recognized in 
actions for damages for personal injuries, 
death, property damage, or other loss due to 
negligence that a court is clothed with power 
to set aside an inadequate verdict and to 
limit a new trial to the issue of damages 
alone, if that issue is so separable and 
distinct from that of negligence and proximate 
cause that the single issue can be tried 
without prejudice or injustice to the other 
party. 
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29 ALR 2d at 1203. 
Utah law follows the nation-wide rule of law with regard 
to granting new trials on less than all issues in order to 
expedite equitable determination of litigation. Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part: 
NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions 
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
op any pf the parties an<3 on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes? 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new 
trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment. (Emphasis added) 
The grounds upon which we rely for a new trial under 
Rule 59 are as follows: 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. (Emphasis added.) 
We cite Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, 611 P.2d 
1216, (Utah 1980), as a case in point. There, the plaintiff was 
driving a passenger automobile south at approximately forty miles 
per hour along a rural, freshly oiled and graveled road that had 
no painted center line. Defendant was driving a pickup truck 
north along the same road. A head-on collision occurred. 
Plaintiff claimed she was traveling on the right side of the road 
and that defendant was traveling in the center of the road. 
Defendant claimed they were both traveling in the center of 
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the road. Each presented expert testimony to support their 
respective contentions on this issue. Plaintiff suffered perma-
nent injuries as a result of the accident, and claimed extensive 
special and general damages. The issues were submitted to the 
jury on special interrogatories. The jury found that defendant 
was 70 percent negligent plaintiff, 30 percent negligent; and 
found special damages of $15,000 (which were actually $15f761.48) 
and general damages of $10,000. Pursuant to our comparative 
negligence statute, the district court then reduced the total of 
$25,000 damages by 30 percent and awarded plaintiff judgment of 
$17,500. 
Plaintiff appealed, asking for a new trial, taking the 
position that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence 
should not have been submitted to the jury and that the damages 
awarded by the jury were inadequate. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case 
for a new trial on damages only. 
See also Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah.2d 350, 366 P.2d 701, 
(Utah 1961). 
The Supreme Court of Alaska addressed itself to whether 
the issues of liability and damages should, under appropriate fact 
situations, be separately tried, in a wrongful death action. See 
State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775, (Ala. 1977). The court, after a 
trial and an appeal, remanded the case for a new trial on damages 
only, stating: 
The jury which apportions the negligence 
must hear all the evidence on liability. In 
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the instant case, the evidence on liability is 
almost entirely separate from the evidence on 
damages . . . We do not find that considera-
tions of judicial economy would be served by a 
retrial of the apportionment of negligence. 
572 P.2d at 785. See also Sturmy Ruger & Company v. Day, 615 P.2d 
621, (Ala. 1980). 
A similar issue arose in the case of Crawford v. Miller, 
18 Wash.App. 151, 566 P.2d 1264, (1977), a case in which a new 
trial was ordered on the issue of apportionment of liability 
alone. The court, in ordering a limited new trial, stated: 
Justice does not require resubmission of the 
entire case to the jury where the award is not 
so low as to, by itself, justify a new trial, 
because the jury has the opportunity to decide 
the liability and damage issues separately 
without facing the uncomfortable results often 
required by the application of the harsh 
contributory negligence rule. 
566 P.2d at 1266. 
Another case in point is Lee v. Zaske, et al., supra. 
In Lee, plaintiffs brought an action for the wrongful death of 
their father and husband, a pedestrian, who was struck and killed 
by the defendant while defendant was driving his automobile at a 
high rate of speed. Plaintiffs' decedent had pulled his auto-
mobile to the side of the road to assist the injured in an 
automobile accident he came upon. Several cars slowed and passed 
by him and others who were also assisting at the scene. Defendant 
came by at 50 miles per hour, turned his car in an attempt to slow 
it down and struck and immediately killed plaintiffs1 decedent. 
There was evidence defendant had defective brakes. 
Defendant claimed as one of his defenses that decedent 
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was contributorily negligent. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in defendant's favor. Plaintiffs appealed claiming the 
trial court erred in submitting the question of decedent's 
contributory negligence to the jury and whether the evidence 
compelled a verdict in favor of plaintiffs as well as several 
other alleged errors. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court and 
held that it was error to submit the issue of contributory 
negligence to the jury. The court emphasized that the burden of 
proof was on the defendant to show decedent was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. There was a total absence of proof as to 
what decedent did when the defendant's car approached him. 
The Supreme Court further held there was sufficient 
evidence to find in plaintiffs' favor on the question of defen-
dant's negligence and remanded the case for a new trial on damages 
only. The court stated in that regard: 
In the light of our view on the foregoing 
questions, there is nothing for a jury to pass 
upon except the question of damages. This 
court has said that neither an appellate nor a 
trial court should put parties to the trouble 
and expense of a retrial of all the issues if 
it is possible to avoid it. Nash v. 
Kirschoff, 161 Minn. 409, 201 N.W. 617. In 
instances too numerous to cite we have sent 
cases back for trial on part of the issues 
where either a well supported verdict or 
finding has settled other issues. See 1 
Dunnell, Dig. & Supplement, Sect. 430. We 
see no distinction between such cases and a 
case where, as here, part of the issues are 
settled by evidence upon which reasonable 
minds could not differ and consequently have 
become questions of law. In a civil case no 
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constitutional right to a jury trial or any 
other fundamental right is thereby infringed. 
When evidence is conclusive, as here, it is no 
longer a jury question. Other states have so 
regarded like situations. In Lavigne v. 
Nelson, 91 N.H. 304, 18 A.2d 832, a motor 
vehicle collision case, the jury disagreed, 
and under the New Hampshire practice, the case 
went to the supreme court, which regarded the 
evidence of liability conclusive and sent the 
case back for trial on the issue of damages 
only. And in Lunde v. Minch, 105 Conn. 657, 
136 A. 552, an action for damages for breach 
of contract to convey real estate, which went 
for the defendants in the lower court, the 
supreme court of Connecticut, finding the 
evidence conclusive in favor of the plaintiff 
on the question of liability, sent the case 
back for trial on the question of damages 
only. In Tudor Arms. Inc. v. McKindall Land 
Co., Inc., 63 R.I. 52, 6 A.2d 735, where an 
action for conversion went for the defendant 
below, the supreme court of Rhode Island 
regarded the record as conclusive of liability 
on the part of the defendant and sent the case 
back for a new trial solely upon the issue of 
damages for conversion. True, the appellants 
here asked for a new trial on all issues but 
challenged the verdict as contrary to the 
evidence. We do not think that because 
appellants ask for a retrial of all issues, 
including those which, properly viewed, were 
already determined by conclusive evidence in 
their favor, the courts must be burdened by 
issues so already determined. (Emphasis 
added.) 
6 N.W.2d at 796. 
In Keegan v. Grant Cty. Public Utility Dist. No. 2, 661 
P.2d 146 (Wash. App. 1983), a jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiffs and awarded damages. Defendant appealed from the 
jury finding of negligence. The evidence at trial was to the 
effect that one of defendant's overhead wires carrying 7,620 volts 
of electricity had fallen to the ground. The hot wire started a 
devastating fire that totally destroyed plaintiff's home and all 
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its contents. 
The Washington appellate court affirmed as to liability, 
but reversed and remanded on the issue of damages. The court 
stated: 
We hold the trial court committed reversible 
error in not allowing Mr. Click to testify. 
However, this does not require the entire 
matter be remanded for a new trial. The case 
was submitted to the jury with the issue of 
the PUD's negligence, the Keegans' negligence, 
and damages all decided separately in answer 
to special interrogatories. There is no 
reason to relitigate the liability issue. 
Courts have the authority to limit issues on a 
new trial in those cases where it clearly 
appears that the original issues were distinct 
and separate from each other and that justice 
does not require the submission of the whole 
case to the jury. McCurdy v. Union Pac. Ry.# 
68 Wash.2d 457, 471, 413 P.2d 617 (1966); 
Nelson v. Fairfield, 40 Wash.2d 496, 501, 244 
P.2d 244 (1952). (Emphasis added.) 
661 P.2d at 152. 
A case most similar to the case at bar is Lomayestewa 
v. Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, 589 S.W.2d 885, (Ky. 1979). This 
case involved a 28-year-old Navajo Indian who was a victim of 
grand mal epilepsy and emotional derangement. While a patient at 
Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, she either jumped or fell through a 
window in her room in the pyschiatric ward. She suffered personal 
injuries and sued the defendant hospital for damages. 
The trial court submitted to the jury the issues of 
the hospital's negligence as well as Lomayestewa's negligence. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant because of 
plaintifffs alleged contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk. 
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The appellate court reversed and ordered that plain-
tiff's motion for judgment n. o. v. on the issue of liability be 
sustained, and granted a new trial on the issue of damages. The 
court based its opinion on the proposition that contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk had no place in the case and 
should not have been presented to the jury at all. The court 
stated: 
We find nothing in our case law which indi-
cates a contrary view. In our view, the very 
purpose of the statutory regulation would be 
completely emasculated if the plaintiff's 
contributory negligence, including the element 
of assumption of risk, was permitted to defeat 
his action against a violator of the statutory 
regulation. It is our conclusion, therefore, 
that the trial judge erred in submitting the 
elements of causation and contributory 
negligence to the jury. The movant made 
timely requests for a directed verdict on the 
issue of liability. The movant's motion for 
judgment n. o. v. should have been granted. 
We, therefore, direct that the trial court 
enter judgment that the respondent is liable 
to the movant. The issue of damages only 
shall be tried by a jury on a retrial. 
589 S.W.2d at 887. 
One additional case should be noted. In Adams v. 
Hildebrand, 124 P.2d 80, (Calif. Dist. Court of Appeals, 1942) 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in an action to 
recover damages for the wrongful death of a two year old child in 
the sum of $250.00. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial on damages only. The appellate court upheld the 
trial court's ruling: 
Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of 
the instant case, we find it was within the 
power of the trial court to grant a motion for 
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a new trial on the issue of damages only, and 
it was also the duty of the trial judge to 
determine whether the issues of negligence and 
damages were severable. The determination of 
the trial judge that these issues were 
severable will not be disturbed by us, since 
there was no showing of abuse of discretion, 
it being conceded that the evidence was 
sharply in conflict upon the issue of negli-
gence. 
at 124 P.2d 81. 
Numerous cases have held that where the issues of 
liability and damages are separable and the issue of liability has 
been fairly tried, the granting of a new trial on damages only is 
a proper remedy. See for example Fields v. Volkswagon of Ameri-
can, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, (Okl. 1976); Denton v. Navratel, 459 P.2d 
761, (Colo. 1969); Alires v. Southern Pacific Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 
490 P.2d 714, (Ariz. 1966); Kovacovich, et ux. v. Phelps Dodge 
Corporation, 156 P.2d 240 (Ariz. 1945); Ferguson v. Northern 
States Power Co., 239 N.W.2d 190, (Minn. 1976). 
In the case at bar, the issue of liability has been 
fairly tried and has been determined in plaintiff's favor. The 
claimed defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk 
must be resolved against defendant in view of the juryfs finding 
that defendant advised plaintiff that she could ski. The only 
remaining issue is that of damages. This is clearly a case for a 
limited trial on that issue under Rule 59. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of our judicial system is to dispose of 
litigation, not to prolong it. Here we have a case that has 
lingered in the courts for many years. The case has now been 
tried and the evidence of both plaintiff and defendant fairly 
presented to a court and jury. 
Under the facts found by the jury in the special 
verdict, it has been determined that defendant failed to give 
adequate and sufficient instructions to his patient, gave her 
advice that she could ski and "have a good time", and released her 
P.R.N, (patient return as necessary). The jury also found that 
defendant's treatment and advice was contrary to the national 
standard of care of orthopedic surgeons in the specialized field 
of total hip arthroplasty, when it found that defendant was 
negligent. Defendant had the burden of proof with regard to his 
claimed defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk. And, as we have pointed out, defendant has presented no 
evidence to support his claim.. And again, there is a total 
absence of evidence to support any claim that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent in the manner in which she skied. 
Question No. 3 allowed the jury to determine that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence and/or assumed the risk of 
injury, solely by virtue of the simple fact that she was skiing. 
There is plainly and simply no way to escape from a matter of law 
determination that contributory negligence and assumption of risk 
disappeared from the case when the jury found that defendant's 
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faulty advice was the very thing that had placed plaintiff on the 
ski slope and caused her injury. Controlling case law makes it 
abundantly clear that if Mrs. Mikkelsen was on the slope as a 
result of Dr. Haslam's advice as the jury has found, she is 
entitled to a judicial determination that contributory negligence 
is not a defense, that assumption of risk is not a defense, that 
comparative negligence is not an issue, that defendant is liable 
for plaintiff's damages, and that a new trial should be granted on 
the issue of damages only. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IJ day of May, 1987. 
BLACK & MOORE 
WAYNEC/L. BLACK 
SUSAN B. DIANA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing BRIEF was mailed, with first-class 
postage thereon, on the / i^1 day of May, 1987, to the follow-
ing: 
Mr. Richard W. Campbell 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
rj) ^ LASx/yX /Is). Q[/A<C 
'A**^\&. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
JUDGMENT UPON JURY VERDICT 
Richard W. Campbell 
Cynthia Campbell 
CAMPBELL, NEELEY & HADLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DaNIECE MIKKELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARLAN J, HASLAM, M.D., 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT UPON 
JURY VERDICT 
Civil No. 77934 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde 
This case came on regularly for trial beginning June 23, 
1986f before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, District Judge. A jury 
was impaneled to try the issues. A special verdict form was 
submitted to the jury and the jury answered the questions therein 
as follows: 
1. Was defendant negligent as alleged by plaintiff? 
X Yes 
No 
2. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes", was such 
negligence a cause of the injuries received by plaintiff. 
_ X „ Yes 
No 
3. Was plaintiff negligent, or did she assume the risk 
of injury, by skiing? 
X „ Yes 
No 
4. If your answer to Question No. 3 is "yes", was such 
negligence or assumption of risk a cause of the injuries sustained 
by plaintiff? 
„ X „ Yes 
„ „ „ No 
5. Concerning only the evidence concerning damages and 
without being concerned with the effect of fault of either party 
on damages in answering this question, what amount of money would 
fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff for injury sustained as 
a result of the accident of March 2, 1980? 
General Damages: $ 
Special Damages: $ 
(The jury failed to answer Question 5 on the premise that its 
finding of 50% fault on each party made an assessment of damages 
unnecessary.) 
If you have answered Questions No. 1 and 2 and have 
found that &Q£h plaintiff and defendant were negligent in a way 
that caused the injuries, answer the following question. 
6. Considering all of the negligence of plaintiff that 
you have found to be a cause of her injuries, and all of the 
negligence of defendant that you have found to be a cause of her 
injuries to total 100%, you will now allocate the 100% negligence 
between the parties. You will weigh the negligence of each party 
against the other party and determine the relative negligence of 
each party in relation to the other. Your answer in percentage 
will reflect your decision. What part of that 100% do you find 
to be attributable to? 
Plaintiff: 50%„ 
Defendant: ,50% 
Total: _100% 
On July 9, 1986, plaintiff, by and through counsel, 
filed a motion to enter judgment and a motion for a new trial* 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of motion for entry of 
judgment in plaintiff's favor on issue of damages. Defendant 
submitted a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motions. 
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Following oral argument, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial in a ruling signed November 7, 1986. 
Now, therefore, upon motion of the defendant, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment herein upon the 
jury verdict be entered in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action, and that defendant recover his 
costs herein as supported by a memorandum of costs. 
DATED this day of December, 1986. 
HONORABLE^RONALD^oT^HYDE^' 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
BLACK & MOORE CAMPBELL, NEELEY & HADLEY 
J2^^±^JZ^ 
WAYNE t . BLACK and RICHARD W. CAMPBELL and 
SUSAN B. DIANA CYNTHIA CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorneys for Defendant 
APPENDIX 2: 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DaNIECE MIKKELSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
MARLAN J. HASLAM, M.D., 
Defendant. ] 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
) Case No. 77934 
We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-
entitled case, give the following answers to the questions 
propounded to us. 
QUESTION NO. 1; Was defendant negligent as alleged by 
plaintiff? 
YES \K 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 2: If your answer to Question No. 1 is 
"yes", was such negligence a cause of the injuries received by 
plaintiff? 
IES y 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 3; Was plaintiff negligent, or did she 
assume the risk of injury, by skiing? 
YES X 
NO 
Page 2 
Special Verdict 
Case No. 77934 
QUESTION NO. 4; If your answer to Question No. 3 is 
"yes", was such negligence or assumption of risk a cause of the 
injuries sustained by plaintiff? 
YES X 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 5: Concerning only the evidence concerning 
damages and without being concerned with the effect of fault of 
either party on damages in answering this questionf what amount 
of money would fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff for 
injury sustained as a result of the accident of March 2, 1980? 
GENERAL DAMAGES: $ 
SPECIAL DAMAGES: $ 
If you have answered Questions No. 1 and 2 and have 
found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in a way 
that caused the injuries, answer the following question. 
QUESTION NO. 6: Considering all of the negligence of 
plaintiff that you have found to be a cause of her injuries, and 
all of the negligence of defendant that you have found to be a 
cause of her injuries to total 100%
 f you will now allocate the 
100% negligence between the parties. You will weigh the 
negligence of each party against the other party and determine 
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the relative negligence of each party in relation to the other. 
Your answer in percentages will reflect your decision. What part 
of that 100% do you find to be attributable to:? 
PLAINTIFF: SO % 
DEFENDANT: _£~Q__% 
TOTAL: 100% 
DATED this day of June, 1986. 
FOREMAN 
APPENDIX 3: 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. _JI__ 
You are instructed that in order to recover against the 
defendant, the plaintiff is not required to prove every act of 
negligence alleged in her Complaint. It is sufficient if she has 
proved by the greater v/eight of the evidence any act or omission 
on the part of defendant which constituted negligence and proxi-
mately caused her injuries and damage. 
APPENDIX 4: 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
INSTRUCTION NO. J L 2 L 
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n a m a l p r a c t i c e s u i t , a 
p l a i n t i f f may p rove a s i n g l e m a t e r i a l f a c t , or a number of 
m a t e r i a l f a c t s , c o n s t i t u t i n g n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of a 
de fendan t , or even the p l a i n t i f f ' s whole case by admiss ions made 
by a defendant under c ros s -examina t ion? p l a i n t i f f may a l s o r e l y , 
in p a i t , upon admiss ions of a defendant under c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n 
and, in paLt , upon thn tes t imony of h i s or her own w i t n e s s e s . 
APPENDIX 5: 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause whichr in 
natural and continuous sequencer unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred* It is the efficient cause, the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplished the injury. 
It may operate directly or through intermediate agencies 
or through conditions created by such agencies. 
APPENDIX 6: 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
IN STRUCT 10 LI NO. Jj£_ 
You are instructed that in the event you should find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant gave plaintiff 
medical advise that she could ski without suffering adverse 
physical risks to her total hip replacement, then it would not be 
negligence on hor part to undertake to ski* 
APPENDIX 7: 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
INSTRUCTION NO* _ilL 
You are instructed that defendant has alleged in his answer 
as a defense that plaintiff assumed the risks incident to her 
skiing activities. In this connection you are further instructed 
thciL plaintiff in legal contemplation cannot be held to have 
assumed the risks incident to her accident unless defendant 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That plaintiff was given medical advise 
before the accident that there was an 
unusual risk to her total hip replacement 
if she were to ski; and 
2. That having knowledge of such risk she 
nevertheless undertook to ski and to 
assume said risk in disregard of said 
medical advise. 
APPENDIX 8: 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Assumption of risk is a doctrine of law encompassed 
within the concept of comparative negligence. This doctrine 
will not permit a party who is doing wrong to place the blame on 
another and recover therefor. Assumption of risk is a voluntary 
and unreasonable exposure to a known danger, or a danger that 
should have been known to a reasonable person in the same or 
similar position. 
APPENDIX 9: 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
INSTRUCTION NO. J2j£_ 
You are instructed that under Utah Comparative Negli-
gence Law, if you should find the defendant 50% negligent or less 
and that that negligence proximately caused the damages suffered 
by the plaintiff in whole or in part and further that the plain-
tiff was 50% negligent or more and that negligence proximately 
caused the damages suffered by the plaintiff in whole or in part? 
the plaintiff will take nothing. However, if the percent of 
neglect on the part of the defendant exceeds that of the plain-
tiff, then the plaintiff will recover damages based upon the 
defendant's proportion of the neglect. Put another way, if 
defendant and plaintiff contributed equally to cause her injuries, 
the plaintiff lones and will recover no damages. 
However, you are to fill out the special verdict form 
sections concerning the damages without regard to your assessment 
of the percentages of neglect. Any reduction in the damages is a 
function for the Court based upon your assessment of percentages 
of neglect and your assessment of the total damages without 
reduction as placed in the appropriate places on the special 
verdict form, 
(Note: To be given only if the court rejects plaintiff's position 
that there is no evidence of contributory negligence in this 
case •) 
